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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-----------------STATE OF UTAH,

)

)

Plaintiff and Respondent, )
)

-vs-

))

DAYTON

J.

BELGARD,

Defendant and Appellant.

)
)

Case No.
11956

)
)
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal by the defendant, Dayton
J. Belgard, from his conviction of the crime of
Second Degree Burglary and the sentence thereon
to the Utah State Prison.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Second Judicial District Court in and
for the County of Weber, State of Utah, after
trial before a jury, sentenced the defendant to
an indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison
upon his conviction of the crime of burglary in
the second degree; defendant having been tried
and convicted before a jury.

2
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks reversal of the convictic·
and judgment thereon and an order directing the
case be dismissed.

I

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant is presently at liberty on an
Appeal Bond granted by the District Court in the
above-entitled matter.
The defendant was accused by a complaint fi
in Ogden City Court on November 1, 1963, of the
crime of Second Degree Burglary, an alleged car
prowl, committed in the nighttime.

On November 26, 1963, the defendant entered)
a plea of guilty to the charge of Burglary in the I
Second Degree before the Honorable Charles G. Cowloj
and was, on December 4, 1963, sentenced to the Uta!:
State Prison.
Thereafter, appea 1s were taken fir1t\
to this Honorable Court, and later to the United I
States District Court for the District of Utah, I
Central Division.
The Honorable A. Sherman Chris·I
tensen, United States District Judge, in a
I
memorandum decision, Dayton J. Belgard v.
Turner, No. C95-69, dated August 6, 1969, granted I
Dayton J. Belgard a Writ of Habeas Corpus and dis·i
charged the defendant from custody unless within I
twenty days the State of Utah permitted the
the right to replead to the original charge. The:
State of Utah appealed this decision by the Federal!
District Court, and the Federal District Court s ·
decision was sustained.
1

The defendant did rep I ead to the charge, and
entered a p 1ea of not gu i 1ty.
Counse 1 was appoint'j
and the matter tried before a jury on October 2j,;
I 969, the defendant being found gu i I ty and sentence!
to the Utah State Prison.
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In the early morning hours of the 19th day
of September, 1963, a Mr. John Knight was preparing to go elk hunting. He testified he had
purchased groceries in excess of Fifty Dollars
in value and placed them in his automobile (T.105).
Thereafter, he drove to 25th Street in Ogden,
Utah, parked the automobile, and went into a
restaurant for breakfast. He then went to a hotel
to see an acquaintance, and upon returning to the
vehicle found the groceries were missing (T.107).
He immediately contacted the Ogden City Police.
An officer named Stettler alleges he saw the
defendant and another man load a box into an automobile around 5:00 A.M. on the same day and at
the same location Mr. Knight reported parking his
vehicle. Officer Stettler further reports that
the time was approximately 5:00 A.M. A few
moments later, Officer Stettler testified, he was
notified by Mr. Knight of the theft and he placed
an alert for the automobile and the men he had
observed (T. 119).
The defendant was taken into custody near
Ogden and returned to the Ogden Police Department.
A written confession was obtained and the defendant
charged with burglary in the second degree.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE HOLDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
REQUIREMENTS OF MIRANDA v. ARIZONA, 384 U.S. 436,
ARE NOT BINDING UPON THE 1969 TRIAL OF THE DEFENDANT IS IN ERROR, INASMUCH AS THE 1969 TRIAL WAS
NOT A ''RETRIAL" WITHIN THE RULING OF THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT IN JENKINS v. DELAWARE, 395 U.S. 213.
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During the interrogation of the defendant in
1963 by the Ogden Pol ice Department, which was
gone into in great detail during the 1969 trial
of the defendant, it is conceded by the Trial Cour:I
(T. 99) that the defendant was not informed of his
right to appointed counsel if he could not afford
to hire his own attorney.

1

Officer Jacobsen at (T.153), the only officer
who interrogated the defendant, states he did not
inform the defendant of the right to appointed
counsel. See also (T.51) wherein the same officer
asserts no such offer was made.
The Honorable Trial Court, at (T. 186), ruled
as fol lows:
"THE COURT. The record may show the
Court interprets the Jaw to be that
Miranda is not binding upon this
trial.
It does not apply. That the
test in this case is the same test
that would have been applied had this
trial taken place in 1963.
Court's determination of findings
of fact that he has been told of his
right to counsel, and that he has been
told of his right to remain silent. I
find no evidence of promise. There is
missing under the Miranda warning the
information concerning the appointment
of counsel, the providing of counsel.
This is missing, but under the circumstances, viewing the Miranda as not
having retroactive effect, I receive
the evidence."

I

It is apparent from the Trial Court's ruling [
that it felt the point of time involved was the
date of the interrogation. The Court specificalli
ruled that Miranda did not have retroactive
1'

i
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Defendant Belgard's trial was held on the
23rd day of October, 1969. The United States
Supreme Court on the 2nd day of June, 1969, decided
the case of Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213.
The Jenkins case dealt specifically with the
problem of how to apply the Miranda case requirements and when they are to have effect.
In Stoval 1 v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, and in
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, the United
States Supreme Court settled upon the date on
which the prohibited procedure was engaged in,
rather than the date the trial was commenced, to
determine the applicability of the newly formulated
Miranda standards.
The United States Supreme Court in Orozco v.
Texas, 394 U.S. 324, is a case decided in March
of 1969, while Jenkins v. Delaware was decided in
June of 1969. There is no mention of the Orozco
case by Chief Justice Warren in the Jenkins
dee is ion.
In the Orozco case, confession evidence was
obtained January 5, 1966. This is prior to the
June 13, 1966, cutoff date announced in Jenkins v'.
Delaware. The ruling in Orozco applies the requirements of Miranda to a confession obtained prior to
June 13, 1966, when offered at a first trial that
was held after June 13, 1966.
In the instant case it appears clearly that
the main issue will be determined by a decision
concerning whether or not Dayton Belgard's trial
in 1969 was a 11Retrial 11 of his 1963 alleged
conviction.
The United States District Court held there
must be an opportunity for the defendant
replead
to the charge within twenty days of the United
States District Court's decision or he would be

6

discharged. It is obvious that the plea of guilt
1
entered in 1963 was of no legal import.
. In the case of State v. Swann, 170 S.E. 2d 611 1
decided November 19, 1969, the Supreme Court of·
North Carolina held that where a defendant had .
inculpat?ry statements during 1964, was trieol
rn 1964 by a Jury and found to be insane, that
thereafter when tried in 1969, that this did not ,
constitute a 11 retrial 11 within the meaning of
Jenkins v. Delaware, and the requirements of
Miranda did apply to statements taken from the
defendant in 1964.

I

The Court continued in the Swann case and
as follows:
11
We cannot accept the view on which
the Court of Appeals based its decision,
namely, that the determination by the
jury at the October 15, 1964 Criminal
Session that defendant was then unable
to plead and stand trial constituted a
trial in the sense used in the Johnson
and Jenkins cases. 11 (emphasis by Court)

In the instant case the matter was not sent
back to the Second Judicial District Court by the'
United States District Court for a 11 new trial 11 or
to be retried, but was sent back for a new plea
(my emphasis). It is therefore apparent that, in
the eyes of the I aw the matter was to be commenceo.
The United States District Court, in holding there
had not been a voluntary and intelligent plea
;
entered by the defendant Belgard in 1963, did not I
order a retrial but ordered a trial in the first I
instance; the purported plea in 1963 not consti·
tuting a valid plea, hence being a nullity.
Therefore, the defendant 1 s trial commenced after
Jenkins v. Delaware and the Court erred in not
requiring the standards enumerated in Miranda to
be fol lowed •
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CONCLUSION
That the District Court erred in ruling that
the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona did not
apply to this case and hence in allowing into
evidence the purported confession of the defendant,
the same having been given in violation of the
requirements of the Miranda case.
Respectfully submitted,
L. G. Bl NGHAM
Attorney for Defendant
and Appe 11 ant
203 24th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401

